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Plea bargaining is spreading into an increasing number of countries in spite of criticisms of scholars around the world. The draw of plea bar-
gaining is the notion that with ever-growing crime rates 
and limited court resources, conducting a full criminal 
trial for every defendant would be impossible. Practitio-
ners even claim that 
without plea bargaining 
the criminal justice system 
would collapse. However, 
critics fear that criminals 
are rewarded for co-operation with the prosecution 
rather than being punished for their crimes, that victims 
are shut out from the process, and that defendants are 
unduly incited to give up basic due process rights. 
Plea bargaining has also been applied in a number of 
international criminal tribunals1 where it faced similar 
criticisms. Due to the very different nature of interna-
tional criminal law, especially the gravity of crimes, it is 
often argued that any negotiations with the alleged per-
petrators are unacceptable.2 This article discusses 
whether the International Criminal Court (ICC) should 
follow the example of other international criminal tribu-
nals and implement a plea bargaining policy. 
International crimes are typically committed in the 
context of armed conflict where the country or region 
has been completely unsettled. Violence has not just 
been a single act of deviant behaviour outside the rule of 
law but has become the rule itself, sanctioned and 
ordered by those in the most powerful positions in 
society, whether they are political, military, religious, or 
economic leaders. In all situations currently before the 
ICC, the violent conflict between the different groups is 
still continuing. 
Thus the ICC has 
objectives that go 
beyond those of 
domestic criminal 
justice systems. It aspires to replace impunity with 
accountability, break the cycle of ethnic violence and ret-
ribution, empower victim groups, facilitate reconcilia-
tion, and restore the rule of law by bringing the guilty to 
justice in a fair trial. In addition, the international crimi-
nal trial is expected to build an extensive and objective 
historical record so that repetition of the conflict can be 
avoided. Furthermore it is hoped that the condemnation 
of individuals, rather than political, ethnic, or racial 
Thanks go to Dr Keith Cooper for comments on an earlier version of this 
article.
1. For example both the UN ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 
as well as in the hybrid courts such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone and 
the Iraqi Special Tribunal.
2. Statement by the president of the ICTY made at a Briefing to Members 
of Diplomatic Missions, IT/29, 11 February 1994 quoted in Michael P. 
Scharf, Trading Justice for Efficiency, 2 J. Int’l CrIm. Just. 1070, at 1073 
(2004).
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groups, opens the way to the recon-
struction of a split society. The inter-
national criminal process is also 
expected to promote human rights 
by developing criminal jurisdiction 
for human rights violations on the 
one hand and due process rights of 
the accused on the other. In the face 
of these multifaceted functions of 
the ICC it has to be questioned to 
what extent plea bargaining can be 
brought in accordance with the 
Court’s role.
Proportionate sentence
Each of the major international trea-
ties such as the four Geneva Conven-
tions (1949), the 1948 Genocide 
Convention, and the Torture Con-
vention (1984) require proportion-
ate punishment. The Statute of the 
ICC (Rome Statute) does not explic-
itly mention proportionate sentenc-
ing but a disproportionate sentence 
is ground for appeal for both prose-
cution and defense.3 Moreover, the 
aspiration to end impunity (as 
declared in the preamble) also 
means that any punishment is pro-
portionate to the crime. One of the 
major criticisms of plea bargaining 
is that a sentence reduction based on 
a plea agreement reflects neither the 
severity of the committed violence or 
the blameworthiness of the convict.
Obviously it is impossible to find a 
punishment for a perpetrator of 
mass atrocities that mirrors the 
crimes. The question is what criteria 
should be taken into consideration 
when finding a sentence that is just. 
The relevant sentencing factors are 
set out in Article 78 and Rule 145 of 
the Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence for the ICC. Except for the 
personal circumstances of the defen-
dant, all criteria set out here refer to 
the commission of the crime itself 
and not to any post factum behaviour. 
While most national criminal justice 
systems acknowledge that acts of rec-
onciliation, co-operation with the 
authorities, and in particular an 
admission of guilt are mitigating 
factors, neither the Rome Statute or 
the Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence introduce such a principle. 
On the other hand, some argue 
that plea bargaining does not auto-
matically mean undue low sentences. 
The Court always has the discretion 
to reject sentences deemed too 
lenient because a promise made by 
the prosecution to the defense is not 
binding on the Court. However, this 
is a very formal argument, which 
does not take into account the infor-
mal pressure on the Court to encour-
age the practice of plea bargaining 
in the long run. Experience at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) has shown that if a 
court repeatedly disregards sentence 
recommendations agreed by the 
parties, future defendants will be 
discouraged from entering into plea 
negotiations.
One practice of plea bargaining, 
which is particularly criticised for 
undermining the principles of 
justice, is charge bargaining. This is 
a form of plea bargaining where the 
prosecution drops some of the 
charges, with the condition that the 
defendant will plead guilty to the 
remaining ones. Thus the offender 
will not face a trial for a number of 
crimes for which the prosecution 
had good evidence and a chance to 
gain a conviction. 
In the ad hoc tribunals charges of 
genocide have been frequently 
dropped for a guilty plea of crimes 
against humanity. Regardless of the 
length of the imprisonment, whether 
a defendant is convicted for one 
account of persecution or several 
accounts of genocide, it is decisive 
not only for an accurate historical 
record but also for the question of 
justice. It is not only the length of 
the sentence but also the judgement 
and its inherent condemnation by 
the international community that 
make them essential parts of justice. 
Moreover, not to prosecute an act of 
genocide for reasons of efficiency 
violates the Genocide Convention.
Plea bargaining indeed bears the 
risk of reducing the sentence unduly 
in exchange for cooperation after 
the crime and leads to convictions 
that neither label the crimes com-
mitted accurately nor punish them 
proportionately. Nevertheless, does 3. Articles 81(2)(a), 83(3) Rome Statute.
Serbian political leader Biljana PlavšiĆ 
(left) pleaded guilty to war crimes at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia. Plea bargaining frees the 
way to quick and uncontested convictions 
and sentences and an admission of guilt 
confirms that the prosecution was right to 
open the case. However, in PlavšiĆ’s case, 
victims welcomed her admission of guilt  
but were appalled by the dropping of 
genocide charges and the lenient sentence.
Far left: Pre-trial judges conducting 
a hearing at the International Criminal 
Court.
AP Photo/Fred ernst, Pool
AP Photo/Peter dejong
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plea bargaining have the potential 
to serve justice? One must not forget 
that every trial carries the risk that a 
factually guilty person might be 
acquitted because the prosecution 
could not prove its case. In interna-
tional criminal law, where investiga-
tion is extremely difficult, this 
possibility cannot be underesti-
mated. Plea bargaining does, 
however, secure an admission of guilt 
and a conviction for just some of the 
charges, so a reduced sentence might 
be preferable to a complete acquittal 
after a full trial. 
Legitimacy
The second problem with plea bar-
gaining is that it might have implica-
tions for the legitimacy of the ICC 
itself. Unlike national criminal 
courts, each of the international 
criminal courts and tribunals has 
been subjected to attacks on their 
legitimacy. From Nuremberg to 
Arusha claims of victors’ justice were 
heard at every tribunal. The ICC, 
which even has potential jurisdiction 
over nationals of non-member states, 
is facing the same allegations. As a 
court that is not an organ of the 
United Nations and that can count 
only two permanent members of the 
Security Council among its member 
states, the ICC still has to prove its 
legitimacy. Therefore it needs to 
demonstrate that it is able to provide 
justice through fair trials, whose cor-
rectness is beyond doubt. 
Plea bargaining on the other hand 
avoids the trial with all its proce-
dural safeguards and thus could give 
the impression that the Court prefers 
quick case disposals by negotiating 
with perpetrators rather than fulfill-
ing its mandate. Moreover, if the 
ICC uses principles of complementa-
rity4 and insists on investigating 
cases by claiming that the national 
state is unable or unwilling to pros-
ecute, any case disposed of without a 
trial by plea bargaining could 
severely damage the Court’s claim of 
admissibility.
On the other hand, considering 
the immense costs of the ICC, the 
Court has to deliver results. In spite 
of the presumption of innocence 
enshrined in the Rome Statute, the 
Court’s success will not only be mea-
sured by the fairness of its trials but 
also by its number of convictions. 
Plea bargaining frees the way to quick 
and uncontested convictions and sen-
tences. Furthermore, an admission of 
guilt confirms that the prosecution 
was right to open the case and that 
the defendant deserves the sentence 
imposed. Hence, every defendant 
who shows remorse and co-operation 
demonstrates that he or she accepts 
the Court and its rulings. 
In the case of Serbian political 
leader Biljana PlavšiĆ the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) noted that 
“by surrendering and pleading guilty, 
Mrs. PlavšiĆ is also sending a power-
ful message about the legitimacy of 
the International Tribunal and its 
functions.”5 Thus, although plea bar-
gaining carries the risk of undermin-
ing the Court’s reputation if it evokes 
a picture of unfair backdoor dealing, 
it has the potential of raising the 
Court’s legitimacy by facilitating 
more convictions and exhibiting 
major perpetrators acknowledging 
the Court
Peace and reconciliation
Besides bringing offenders to justice, 
another central function of interna-
tional criminal justice is to support 
peace and reconciliation. Plea bar-
gaining can contribute to this aim 
too because, in addition to the 
admission of responsibility, the 
defendant’s expression of remorse is 
a source for healing. Moreover, the 
public acknowledgement of the 
victims’ suffering can be of immea-
surable value for ongoing peace 
efforts. Conversely, one could hold 
that the victims deserve these con-
cessions by the perpetrators of 
immeasurable suffering without the 
defendant being offered a sentence 
reward. 
What is more, the defendant’s 
admission of guilt will have little 
meaning if it does not convey sincer-
ity. PlavšiĆ’s admission of responsi-
bility and acknowledgement of the 
victims’ innocence at the ICTY was 
for many Serbs no reason to reassess 
the conflict. Many saw her statement 
as an act of betrayal of her beliefs in 
return for the offers by the Tribu-
nal.6 At the same time, the victims 
who welcomed PlavšiĆ’s admission 
were appalled by the dropping of the 
genocide charges and the lenient 
sentence.7 Moreover, further conces-
sions offended the victims and thus 
undermined the reconciliatory effect 
of the confession.8 On top of that, 
any possible healing was lost after 
PlavšiĆ redacted her confession as 
soon as she was released from prison 
in 2009.
Plea bargaining has the potential 
to make a valuable contribution to 
peace and reconciliation but whether 
this opportunity materializes will 
depend on the circumstances in 
each case and cannot be claimed as 
a general rule. The ICC will need to 
make sure that the impact of each 
plea bargain for peace and reconcili-
ation is evaluated individually.
Victims
The ICC is commended for its inno-
vative improvement of the role of 
the victim. Prosecution, Pre-trial 
Chamber, and Trial Chamber are 
required by the Rome Statute to con-
sider the views and concerns of the 
victims at all stages.9 This under-
standing of the central role of the 
victim in international criminal 
justice must not be undermined by a 
misuse of plea bargaining. The ques-
tion of what impact plea bargaining 
has on the interest of the victims is 
however ambiguous. An agreement 
between defense and prosecution 
4.  Articles 17 and 18 Rome Statute.
5. Prosecutor v. Biljana Plavšić, Sentencing 
Judgement, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1, (Feb, 27, 
2003) para 76.
6. Alissa J. Rubin, Former Serb Leader’s Admission 
of Guilt Alienates Compatriots, Los Angeles Times, 
Dec. 16, 2002, at A4.
7. A. Kebo (2003, February, 24-28). Regional 
report: Plavšić sentence divides Bosnia. Institute for 
War and Peace Reporting’s Tribunal Update, 302 
accessible at http://www.iwpr.net/?p=tri&s
=f&o=166268&apc_state=henitri2003 (last visited 
July 2010).
8. PlavšiĆ was sent to a Swedish prison that 
offered inmates access to sauna, gym, solarium, 
massage room, and, horse-riding paddock. 
Patrick McLoughlin, Jail with “human touch” may 
await Bosnia’s Plavsić, Reuters, June 6, 2003 avail-
able at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/
f-news/924094/posts (last visited June 2009).
9. See Articles 15 (3), 19(3), 53 (1) (c), 54(1)
(b), 65 (4)(a), 75(1) Rome Statute.
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might have very diverse effects on 
different victims. 
One of the most important advan-
tages is that an admission of guilt 
saves victims the ordeal of testifying. 
A trial at an international court 
means that the witness usually has to 
travel a long way from home to a 
foreign country. Moreover, testifying 
might put the safety of the witnesses 
and their families at risk. Most impor-
tantly, testimony, especially if under 
cross-examination, might mean the 
witness has to re-live the trauma of 
victimization.10 
Not every victim, however, per-
ceives the trial as an encumbrance. 
Active participation in the proce-
dures and the opportunity to tell 
their story can, on the contrary, con-
stitute a significant healing factor. 
However, the avoidance of trial 
through plea bargaining deprives 
victims of a forum to share their 
history with the international com-
munity. Moreover, the public expo-
sure of the perpetrator at trial is part 
of the satisfaction brought to the 
victims and an important part of the 
justice process. It seems unaccept-
able to take this away from victims in 
order to shorten the procedure. 
On the other hand, the defen-
dant’s admission of guilt and 
acknowledgement of the victims’ suf-
fering induced by a plea agreement 
might help victims in their healing 
process. Further, many victims might 
wish for a quick conviction after a 
confession, rather than a judgement 
after years of trial and appeal proce-
dures. Additionally, since plea bar-
gaining saves time and resources 
spent on trials, more offenders can 
be brought to justice, which again is 
in the interest of the victims.11 
The crucial downside for victims 
is the possible restriction of charges 
and the sentence reduction entailed 
in the bargain. Those who commit-
ted the most heinous atrocities are 
shown leniency for co-operating 
with the Court rather than being 
severely punished. For example, 
empirical research in Sarajevo shows 
that in spite of a common view that 
trials take too long, only 6 percent of 
the respondents approved of plea 
bargaining.12 
With no death penalty and life 
sentence as an exception,13 the sen-
tence range of the ICC is already 
perceived by some as too low and 
further reductions would disappoint 
many of the victims who had hoped 
the ICC would bring justice. When 
deciding whether to accept an admis-
sion of guilt according to Article 65 
(4) the Trial Chamber can either 
request further witness testimonies 
from the prosecutor or even decide 
to conduct a full trial. Following 
from the spirit of this provision, 
when considering the possibility of 
engaging in plea negotiations, the 
prosecution should evaluate in each 
case what impact an agreement 
would have for the victims.
defendants
Since one major function of interna-
tional criminal law is to promote 
human rights, the ICC must pay 
high respect to international defen-
dants’ rights such as the right to fair 
trial, the right to a public hearing, 
the right to examine or have exam-
ined witnesses on their behalf, the 
right not to be compelled to testify 
against themselves, and most of all 
the right to be presumed innocent 
until proven guilty.14 The core of 
plea bargaining is however the avoid-
ance of a full trial, which means that 
the defendant loses all these rights. 
Nevertheless, the advantages of an 
agreement with the prosecution 
often outweigh the loss of rights in 
the eyes of defendants. If a defen-
dant assumes that there is a realistic 
chance of conviction, the possibility 
of a withdrawal of the most serious 
charges and the promise of a consid-
erable sentence concession must be 
compelling. In addition, plea bar-
gaining spares the defendant the 
shame and indignity of a public 
trial, including examination and 
cross-examination. 
At the same time, the prospect of a 
significant sentence reduction means 
considerable pressure for the defen-
dant to agree to the offer. As a lay-
person it is very difficult if not 
impossible to evaluate the strength 
of the prosecution’s case, to calculate 
the risk of a conviction after trial, 
and to estimate the length of a pos-
sible sentence. Thus it is more than 
likely that in domestic courts for-
mally innocent defendants, where 
the prosecution would not have been 
able to prove guilt beyond reason-
able doubt, have entered into a plea 
agreement and thus discarded a high 
chance of acquittal. The question 
arises whether this could also happen 
at the ICC. Considering the mani-
fold evidential problems of interna-
tional prosecutions and the very high 
standard of defendants’ rights in the 
Rome Statute, the prosecution could 
be tempted to offer high sentence 
discounts to induce an admission of 
guilt in an otherwise weak case. 
Through this pressure plea bargain-
ing could deprive some defendants 
of their fair trial rights.
Another danger for defendants is 
the risk that the promised sentence 
reduction is not awarded. The pros-
ecution can only recommend a sen-
tence to the Trial Chamber but the 
Court is bound neither by recom-
mendation nor the agreement. A 
full admission of guilt with an 
expression of remorse might con-
vince the Court that a significantly 
low sentence can be justified but the 
defendant has to fear that the Court 
will not accept the admission as a 
sufficient sign of compunction and 
as a mitigating circumstance. Even 
in a case of charge bargaining, the 
defendant is not offered much cer-
tainty. Similar to the ad hoc tribu-
nals, the judges at the ICC have very 
broad sentencing discretion15 and 
can, even if some of the charges are 
withdrawn, pass a severe sentence for 
the remaining charges. 
It is therefore important for the 
10. Prosecutor v. Plavšić Feb 27, 2003 Sentencing 
Judgement para 68.
11. Anna Petrig, Negotiated Justice and the Goals 
of International Criminal Tribunals—With a Focus on 
the Plea-Bargaining Practice of the ICTY and the Legal 
Framework of the ICC, 8 ChI.-Kent J. Int’l And 
Comp. l. 1, at 22 (2008).
12. Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovi and John Hagan, The 
Politics of Punishment and the Siege of Sarajevo: 
Toward a Conflict Theory of Perceived International 
(In)Justice, 40 lAw & soC’y rev. 369, at 396 (2006).
13. Article 77 Rome Statute.
14. Article 14 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, 16 Dec. 1966, 99 
U.N.T.S. 171.
15. Articles 76(1), 77, 78(1) Rome Statute. 
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defendant that “at all times, he will 
proceed cautiously, careful to 
approach the court with reverence, to 
exhibit remorse, and to display a def-
erential, respectful, and compliant 
demeanour.”16 Consequently, defen-
dants might not dare to claim all 
their rights or appeal against interim 
court decisions. Again this would 
mean that the practice of plea bar-
gaining indirectly deprived defen-
dants of their due process rights.
At the same time, defendants will 
find it very hard to retract an admis-
sion of guilt once it is made.17 In the 
instance of a redaction, the case will 
be remitted to a different Trial 
Chamber18 but since there are only 
seven judges at the Trial Division it 
will be difficult for the defendant 
not to suspect bias of the new 
Chamber.19 Thus, defendants who 
are offered a deal are expected to 
take a significant risk whereas the 
prosecution has nothing to lose. 
This situation refutes the principle 
of fair trial. 
The ICTY introduced procedural 
safeguards based on legal instru-
ments of the United States, which is 
often called the cradle of plea bar-
gaining. Rule 62bis in the ICTY 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
provides for the minimum require-
ments under which the Tribunal can 
accept a guilty plea. The Trial 
Chamber has to satisfy itself that the 
guilty plea has been made volun-
tarily, is informed and not equivocal, 
and that there is a sufficient factual 
basis for the crime and the participa-
tion of the accused in it. However, as 
has been shown elsewhere, the Tri-
bunal rarely examines these require-
ments in any detail.20 
It is therefore questionable whether 
a similar provision for the ICC could 
sufficiently protect the defendant. It 
could be argued that the defendant is 
safeguarded against misuse of plea 
bargaining by the defense counsel. 
However, experience in the ad hoc 
tribunals (the ICTY and ICTR) has 
shown that frequently defendants dis-
trust international defense lawyers 
and prefer national counsel who have 
often little or no experience in inter-
national criminal procedures. 
Further, if the defense counsel 
comes from a system that does not 
apply plea bargaining they might not 
be familiar with this practice at all. 
Considering the far reaching conse-
quences of an agreement this lack of 
experience can be fatal. In the case 
of Bosnian soldier Drazen Erdemovi 
the defense counsel allegedly “neither 
understood the concept of a guilty 
plea nor comprehended the nature 
of the charges against the client”.21 
However, Rule 62bis and Article 65 
Rome Statute set out a judicial test. 
Thus it is the Court’s duty to protect 
the defendant from any undue pres-
sure or submitting an uninformed 
admission of guilt. The ICC should 
therefore not delegate such a duty to 
a defense lawyer, no matter how expe-
rienced the counsel is.
A third disadvantage of plea bar-
gaining from the defendant’s stand-
point is that this practice results in 
different treatment of offenders who 
have committed comparable crimes. 
Those defendants who can offer co-
operation, especially valuable infor-
mation against other defendants, 
can benefit from concessions that 
offenders of similar crimes cannot. 
Thus similar crimes might be sen-
tenced unequally. However, this was 
more of a problem for the ad hoc tri-
bunals who were dealing with defen-
dants of low as well as of high 
responsibility. It is unlikely that the 
ICC will face the same dilemma as it 
will be restricted to a small number 
of defendants accused of carrying 
the most responsibility for the most 
serious crimes.
costs of proceedings
The major advantages of plea bar-
gaining for courts are the immense 
savings in terms of time and 
resources, as it offers a way to avoid a 
full-length trial. For example, when 
the ICTY was under considerable 
pressure from the UN and the 
United States to expedite proceed-
ings, it could hardly afford to reject 
such an efficient practice.22 
An international criminal trial is 
on average not only much lengthier 
than national proceedings but like-
wise much more costly. International 
infrastructure for transport and 
communication as well as security 
measures for witnesses, defendants, 
and court staff is needed. All docu-
ments need to be translated and 
hearings simultaneously interpreted 
into a number of languages. The 
Court not only needs highly quali-
fied interpreters and translators 
but also the newest IT technology 
in the courtroom for the defense 
and prosecution teams, the judges, 
the clerks, the defendant, and the 
witnesses. On top of this filming, 
recording, and broadcasting equip-
ment is needed to facilitate trans-
parency and access for the public. 
In addition to avoiding a full trial, 
plea bargaining also contributes to 
cost saving because it encourages 
defendants to provide valuable evi-
dence in other cases, which frees up 
further resources for investigation. 
Unfortunately, it will only be a 
question of time before the ICC has 
to face similar resource and caseload 
problems as the ICTY. One would be 
forgiven for thinking that the ICC 
will not be as overworked as the ad 
hoc tribunals because they do not 
have a fixed mandate and thus do not 
face the same pressure of a comple-
tion order as the UN courts did. 
Furthermore, unlike the ad hoc 
tribunals, the ICC is restricted to 
deal with only those defendants sus-
pected of the most responsibility 
rather than low-level offenders. In 
addition, the principle of comple-
mentarity enables national states to 
prosecute international criminals 
and therefore, it is hoped, lighten 
the burden of the ICC. However, 
considering how occupied the ICC 
already is now with only one trial, it 
16. Julian A. Cook, Plea Bargaining at The 
Hague, 30 yAle J. for Int’l l. 473, at 491 (2005).
17. For example in the case of Dragoljub 
Kunarac before the ICTY the Trial Chamber and 
the parties agreed that the requirements of rule 
62bis had not been met, and the case proceeded 
to trial on a presumption of innocence. Prosecutor 
v. Kunarac, Kovac, Vukovic, (Case No. IT-96-23-I) 
Transcript (ICTY Trial Chamber II, March 13, 
1998) at 44.
18. Article 65(4)(b) Rome Statute.
19. The ICC has at the moment 18 judges in total.
20. Regina Rauxloh, Negotiated History—The 
Historical Record in International Criminal Law and 
Plea Bargaining, 10 Int’l CrIm. l. rev. 739 (2010).
21. Cook supra n. 16, at 499.
22. Id. at 477.
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can be expected to be overburdened 
in the not too distant future. Further, 
although the ICC does not have a 
fixed mandate its funding derives 
from the State Assembly who will 
press the Court to work most 
efficiently.
When considering the establish-
ment of international criminal tribu-
nals there was no doubt that 
international criminal procedures 
would be immensely costly even if 
the actual costs and length might 
have exceeded the worst fears. Nev-
ertheless the international commu-
nity has decided to spend these 
resources on providing for fair trials 
and not, for instance, use the money 
to rebuild the war torn society. For 
this reason it cannot be justified to 
save resources by avoiding these very 
same trials. In view of available 
resources the Rome Statute is already 
setting out a number of case selec-
tion criteria, which in effect limit the 
scope of justice. Justice should not 
however be diminished further 
simply for efficiency. The Court has 
to be clear that expediency alone is 
not a valid reason to offer sentence 
reductions. Nor is plea bargaining a 
valid tool to reduce an overburden-
ing case load. 
access to evidence
The most compelling incentive for 
plea bargaining for the ICC is argu-
ably the difficulties of international 
criminal investigations compared 
with national procedures. With 
regards to the investigation, interna-
tional crime differs from domestic 
crime in three principal facets: the 
scale of the violence, the prosecu-
tion’s dependency on state co-opera-
tion, and the difficulties of linking 
the crime to high-profile offenders.
The huge number of acts commit-
ted in the context of international 
crime renders every criminal 
investigation extremely complex. 
Typically, there are numerous perpe-
trators and the number of victims 
and possible witnesses can run into 
tens of thousands. The magnitude of 
the mayhem requires examining an 
immense volume of forensic evi-
dence, witness testimony, expert 
witness statements, and relevant doc-
uments. Most of the investigative 
work has to be carried out in coun-
tries where the conflict might be 
on-going and security for investiga-
tors and witnesses uncertain. 
What is more, in war torn regions 
communication and transport infra-
structures are often seriously inter-
rupted even after the conflict has 
ended. The need for interpreters 
during the interrogations and trans-
lations of the relevant documents 
pose further logistic difficulties. 
Another problem is the length of the 
investigation, which means witnesses 
become less reliable. Child soldier 
witnesses are, for example, asked to 
recall words spoken to them when 
they were half the age they are now. 
What is even more problematic in 
international investigation is the 
ICC’s lack of an investigation force 
comparable to national police forces. 
This means the prosecution is 
dependent on state co-operation for 
a number of different aspects 
ranging from providing office space, 
local police officers and interpreters 
for taking witness statements, to 
access to official documents and 
archives or just visas to enter the 
country. Moreover, the Court needs 
state assistance to get access to both 
witnesses and suspects because 
unlike national courts the ICC does 
not have subpoena powers. This 
badly needed co-operation of the 
state might not be forthcoming as 
every international criminal investi-
gation is politically sensitive.
According to the principle of com-
plementarity only cases where the 
relevant state is unable or unwilling 
to prosecute itself are investigated by 
the ICC.23 In such a case it is ques-
tionable whether the same state 
would be able or willing to provide 
the necessary support to the prosecu-
tion. Member states of the ICC are 
under the obligation to fully co-oper-
ate with the Court24 but there is no 
effective enforcement mechanism in 
place to ensure such co-operation.25 
In the case where the relevant state is 
not a member state but the United 
Nations Security Council referred 
the situation to the Court, the refer-
ral resolution should compel all states 
to co-operate with the ICC.26 Regret-
tably, so far the Security Council has 
not pursued this avenue. In its refer-
ral of the situation in Darfur to the 
Court27 in 2005 the Security Council 
acknowledged “that States not party 
to the Rome Statute have no obliga-
tion under the Statute” and “urged” 
non-member States to co-operate 
fully.28 State co-operation of both 
member states and non-member 
states is therefore in practice mainly 
voluntary.
Finally, the third major difficulty 
for the prosecution stems from the 
ICC targeting only those perpetra-
tors who carry the greatest responsi-
bility for the crimes. This means 
rather than dealing with offenders 
of low- or middle-rank, ICC defen-
dants will come from the military, 
political, or economic leadership. 
These defendants are prosecuted 
mainly not for crimes they have com-
mitted as principals but for planning 
and ordering the mass atrocities. 
Since high-rank officials usually do 
not leave a paper-trail of their orders, 
one of the biggest problems for the 
prosecution is to prove the link 
between defendant and the crime. 
The victims can usually only identify 
the trigger-pullers not the com-
mander who masterminded the 
attack. Therefore, often it is only a 
co-defendant in a similarly high 
position in the chain of command 
who has eye-witnessed the com-
mander issuing orders and can 
testify against him or her. 
It is in this situation where plea 
bargaining can play a crucial role in 
accessing the only available evidence 
by inducing co-defendants to testify 
against their former leaders. Where 
defendants hold the key to sufficient 
evidence against the most responsible 
perpetrator, plea bargaining might 
be the only way to avoid an acquittal 
23. Article 17(1)(a) Rome Statute.
24. Article 86 Rome Statute.
25. According Article 87(7) Rome Statute the 
matter can be referred to the State Assembly but 
this body has no enforcement power against state 
parties.
26. Article 13(b) Rome Statute.
27. UN SC Resolution 1593(2005).
28. UN SC Resolution 1593(2005) para 2.
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on grounds of lack of proof. Although 
justice is reduced because a guilty 
offender is awarded a reduced sen-
tence, overall more justice is gained 
because an otherwise weak case 
against the most responsible offender 
is strengthened. Because of the intrin-
sic difficulties of investigations of 
international crime set out above, the 
situation where the key evidence 
against the central defendant can 
only be gained through a co-offender 
might arise more often than antici-
pated. Thus, it is argued here that 
plea bargaining is needed not as a 
means of efficiency but as a tool of 
gaining evidence to overcome the 
inherent difficulties of international 
criminal law.
Plea bargaining in the icc
It has been shown that plea bargain-
ing has a significant impact on the 
major themes of international crimi-
nal law such as justice, legitimacy of 
the Court, peace and reconciliation, 
the role of victims, the rights of the 
defendant, the costs of the proceed-
ings, and access to evidence. Thus 
any use of plea bargaining by the 
ICC has to be carefully balanced with 
these interests. 
One question that was long debated 
at the Rome Conference was what 
consequence a declaration of guilt 
should have. While in civil law systems 
a confession is a piece of evidence 
without procedural consequences as 
such, in common law countries the 
trial is concluded in case of a guilty 
plea. A compromise was found, avoid-
ing the terms ‘confession’ and ‘guilty 
plea’ and instead introducing the 
‘admission of guilt’ in Article 65. As in 
common law the admission of guilt 
means the trial is concluded.29 
Leaning on the model of civil law 
however, the Court has to examine 
whether the admission is sustained by 
the facts of the case30 and otherwise 
request a more complete presenta-
tion of the facts.31 Article 65(5) 
neither allows nor forbids plea bar-
gaining explicitly.32 On the one hand 
it acknowledges settlements between 
prosecution and defense and on the 
other it emphasizes that the Court is 
not bound by such agreements. 
Since plea bargaining is neither 
prescribed nor forbidden it remains 
to be seen how the Court will choose 
to apply their discretion to honour 
the parties’ agreements. If the Trial 
Chambers were to develop a practice 
of discounting agreements between 
defense and prosecution it would be 
impossible to develop a relationship 
of trust in the long run and plea bar-
gaining could not develop into a 
general practice. The defense 
counsel in Dragan Nikoli’s case felt 
that the prosecutor had not hon-
oured the agreement and warned 
that this “will be noted by those 
whose duty it is to advise on the issue 
of making a Plea Agreement with the 
Prosecutor.”33 
If on the other hand the ICC 
became known to generally respect 
the agreements, plea bargaining 
would thrive. Since the Rome Statute 
invites or at least does not hinder 
plea bargaining and, considering the 
manifold advantages that were set 
out above, the ICC might start using 
plea bargaining once it has more 
cases to cope with. This prediction is 
supported by the fact that with the 
completion of the ICTY many court 
staff will move from that Tribunal, 
where plea bargaining was used on a 
regular basis, to the ICC. 
Should the icc  
use plea bargaining?
Once the ICC has achieved the 
difficult tasks of bringing a defen-
dant before the Court, it seems 
not only contradictory but against 
the very essence of the Court to 
dispose of this very trial through 
plea bargaining. However, in the 
face of the very different goals 
and circumstances of interna-
tional criminal justice compared 
to domestic procedures the use of 
plea bargaining might be not only 
helpful but even necessary. Never-
theless, plea bargaining poses 
some serious disadvantages, such 
as the risk to defendants, victims’ 
interests, and the Court’s legiti-
macy. Thus it is vital that plea 
bargaining is only used in those 
circumstances that can justify the 
circumvention of a trial. Plea 
bargaining should be allowed 
only if a) the plea bargain leads to 
the defendant offering new evi-
dence or contributes to reconcili-
ation and b) if high standards of 
safeguards can be enforced. 
When is plea bargaining justified? 
It is submitted here that there are 
only three functions that justify the 
use of plea bargaining at the ICC. 
First, considering the difficulties of 
international criminal investigations, 
the prosecutor should use plea bar-
gaining as a tool to gain otherwise 
unavailable evidence against high-
ranking defendants who could oth-
erwise hide behind the power 
hierarchy. Second, the use of plea 
bargaining is justified where it can 
encourage defendants to submit pre-
viously unknown facts that are an 
essential addition to the historical 
record and that otherwise might be 
lost to public knowledge. Finally, a 
plea bargain should be considered as 
a tool of reconciliation when it 
incites an admission of guilt, expres-
sion of remorse, and acknowledg-
ment of the victims’ suffering. The 
ICC will need to develop relevant 
criteria and indicators to make such 
evaluation over the years based on 
experience and in cooperation with 
different stakeholders.
In order to be able to restrict the 
use of plea bargaining to these three 
circumstances the ICC has to be 
careful to avoid a situation where the 
need for efficiency makes trials less 
favourable than plea arrangements. 
The Court should therefore be very 
strict on its case selection criteria and 
ensure that it only indicts as many 
suspects as it can afford to provide a 
full trial. Unlike the ad hoc tribunals 
29. Article 65(2) Rome Statute.
30. Article 65(1)(c) Rome Statute.
31. The Trial Chamber may order summary 
proceedings where the prosecution can present 
additional evidence or order a full trial (Article 
65(4)) Rome Statute.
32. Article 65 (5) reads: “Any discussions 
between the Prosecutor and the defence regard-
ing modification of the charges, the admission of 
guilt or the penalty to be imposed shall not be 
binding on the Court.”
33. Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikoli, Case No. IT-94-
2-A, Appellant’s Brief in Reply to the Prosecution 
Respondent’s Brief (Aug. 25, 2004) page 5, cited 
in Nancy Armoury Combs, Procuring Guilty Pleas 
for International Crimes: The Limited Influence of Sen-
tence Discounts, 59 vAnd. l. rev. 69, at 99 (2006).
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the ICC should focus on leaders only. 
The Court has to remember that 
its mandate is not to provide justice 
for all involved parties. This is still 
the role of the national courts. Sec-
ondly, in order to establish general 
elements such as the existence of an 
attack against a civilian population 
or an armed conflict, the Trial 
Chambers should consider saving 
time and resources by using evi-
dence from previous cases. The 
Court should avoid situations like in 
the ICTY where some expert wit-
nesses were asked to give the same 
evidence at different trials.34 
In addition, the need for using 
plea bargaining to overcome eviden-
tial problems should be diminished 
by improving state cooperation. 
Experience shows that the interna-
tional community is able to put con-
siderable pressure on national states 
to co-operate if there is political 
will.35 Both the United Nations as 
well as involved states must be aware 
of the impact their co-operation or 
lack thereof will have on the proce-
dures of the ICC.
High standard of safeguards. If 
the ICC decides to use plea bargain-
ing, it has to warrant that the rule of 
law is not undermined. The Court 
can only safeguard the rights of the 
defendant if it examines all the 
requirements of Article 65 thor-
oughly. Article 65 requires the Trial 
Chamber to ensure that the admis-
sion was made voluntarily and with 
an understanding of the nature and 
consequences of the admission.36 If 
the elements of Article 65(1) are not 
met, the Trial Chamber has to 
proceed to trial and the admission of 
guilt is deemed not to have been 
made.37 
Learning from the experience of 
the ad hoc tribunals, it has to be 
asked whether the Trial Chambers 
will apply the safeguards of Article 
65 with sufficient endeavour since 
they take up time and resources and 
might also discourage plea agree-
ments. The Court must not only 
ascertain that the admission of guilt 
was made voluntarily but in addition 
that the defendant understands in 
full detail the extent of the rights 
they are surrendering. A provision 
should be added to the Rules of Pro-
cedure and Evidence that requires 
the Trial Chamber to inform the 
defendant explicitly about the conse-
quences of an admission of guilt and 
the fact that the Court is bound to 
an earlier agreement with the pros-
ecution. This clarification has to be 
issued by the Court and must not be 
left to defense counsel. 
Furthermore, so far the Rome 
Statute does not address any partici-
pation of the Trial Chamber in any 
negotiations. If there was involve-
ment and the Chamber has indi-
cated certain consequences in case 
of an admission of guilt the Court 
should be bound by this indication 
unless new circumstances, for 
example new evidence of aggravat-
ing factors, should arise. Carefully 
examining the requirements of 
Article 65 and fully informing the 
defendant mean prolonging the 
hearing and reducing the timesav-
ing effect of the plea bargain. Com-
pared to a full trial, however, this 
procedure will still have saved a sub-
stantial amount of time. More 
importantly, both are indispensable 
safeguards to protect the defendant 
as well as the legitimacy of the prac-
tice of plea bargaining at the ICC. 
conclusions
Ideally, the factually guilty high-
profile offender would be convicted 
and given an appropriate sentence 
after a full trial in which a historical 
record of the conflict had been 
established and the leader’s involve-
ment proven beyond reasonable 
doubt. Like most national criminal 
justice systems, the ICC will without 
doubt be very overworked in the 
near future. Too many armed con-
flicts are fought around the world 
with too many crimes committed by 
numerous perpetrators who are 
attacking a vast number of victims. 
At the same time, the Rome 
Statute exceeds the minimum stan-
dard of international human rights 
and provides for a range of defen-
dants’ as well as victims’ rights. It 
can be expected that each case will 
take several years of trial and appeal 
procedures, which will disillusion 
victims as well as the general public. 
This is mainly a resource issue that 
needs to be addressed by increased 
funding and possibly the appoint-
ment of more judges and prosecu-
tors. Additionally, more pressure 
should be put on national states to 
deal with these atrocities in munici-
pal courts. The ICC must make sure 
it limits its cases to a number it can 
afford to try. 
As has been shown, plea bargain-
ing can support the main goals of 
international criminal justice if used 
carefully. The danger is that the 
need for efficiency will overshadow 
other values. It is therefore argued 
here that it is vital for the ICC, when 
developing a practice of plea bar-
gaining, to restrict sentence dis-
counts due to plea agreements under 
strict safeguards. 
The working pressure of a close-
knit network will be immensely high 
on both judges and prosecutors, but 
the Court must not forget that not 
only the interests of defendants, 
victims, and the public but also the 
legitimacy of the ICC depends on 
their exercise of plea agreements 
and sentence discounts. An ICC that 
used plea bargaining excessively and 
disposed of too many trials because 
of plea bargaining would alienate 
both victims and states already 
opposing the Court. A few full trials 
serve justice better than a high 
number of quick convictions that are 
not considered legitimate. The ICC 
has no power other than its legiti-
macy, and loss of legitimacy and a 
feeling that the Court is bypassing its 
mandate cannot be afforded. g
34. D.A. Mundis, Improving the Operation and 
Functioning of the International Criminal Tribunals, 
94 AJIL 759, 775 (2000) .
35. For example, in 2001 the U.S. threatened 
Yugoslavia to withhold financial support from the 
IMF and the World Bank and millions of U.S. 
dollars in direct economic assistance if Slobodan 
Milosevic, who had been indicted by the ICTY, 
was not arrested.
36. This provision is based on Rule 62bis of the 
ICTY RPE and Rule 62(v) of ICTR RPE.
37. Article 65(3) Rome Statute.
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